No. 357 (March 19)
Ukraine\u2019s armed forces: whither reforms? by -
#10 (357), 19 March 2007
ICPS newsletter
A publication of the International Centre for Policy Studies
®
On 12 February 2007, President Yushchenko
approved the National Security Strategy of
Ukraine. The drafting and periodic
adjustment of this strategy is governed by
the 2003 Law “On the basis for Ukraine’s
national security.” The strategic objectives
of national security policy include
reforming security sector institutions,
especially the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
How Armed Forces reform 
has evolved 
The need to rebuild Ukraine’s Armed Forces
arose immediately after the country gained
independence in 1991. The changing
geopolitical situation, the change in the
nature of security threats, and the
impossibility of maintaining Soviet-era
military structures all meant that deep
qualitative and structural reforms of the
armed forces were necessary.
In the first years of independence, the
state’s policy towards the Armed Forces was
far from systematic. When it became
independent in 1991, Ukraine had virtually
no experience of how to manage the
defense sector independently. During soviet
times, it did not have its own defense
ministry and the only coordinating center
was the central MOD in Moscow. The
formation of independent Ukraine’s military
structures lasted until almost 1995. The
first strategic document relating to defense
reform was the State Program for the
Building and Development of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine 1997–2005. 
The first comprehensive document to take
an open look at Ukraine’s defense policy
was the “Ukrainian Strategic Defense
Review to 2015,” a report on the results of a
defense review carried out in Ukraine
published in 2004. An important step
towards strengthening the Armed Forces’
transparency and public accountability was
the publication of a White Paper on
Ukraine’s Defense Policy at the start of
2006.
Key objectives of Armed Forces
reform
The main priority for defense reform in
Ukraine continues to be reducing and
reorganizing the forces in order to ensure
that they better suit to the threats and
challenges faced by the state today. This
can only be achieved if the strategic
objectives for defense reform are clearly
defined, which in turn depends on how well
the national security concept as a whole
defines priorities and objectives. The
inflated list of national security threats in
current drafts of the concept make it
impossible to focus effectively on the most
pressing problems:
• Reducing troop numbers
• Switching to a fully professional army
• Reforming organizational and governing
structures 
• Destroying surplus weapons and military
equipment
• Updating necessary military equipment
• Developing new military technologies
and supporting the defense industry 
Reducing troop numbers
Various estimates place the number of
service personnel in Ukraine in 1991 from
700,000 to over 1 million. Since then, troop
numbers have been gradually reduced.
Further reductions are currently being
hindered by the need to maintain a large
number of troops to protect and service
surplus weapons and equipment that are
awaiting destruction. The plans for further
reductions also envisage introducing the
concept of outsourcing to Ukraine’s Armed
Forces.
This has the potential to reduce the number
of employees and troops in the Armed
Forces by about another 20,000. However,
this will only be possible if the Government
maintains the financial commitments made
in the State Program for the Support of the
Armed Forces through 2007 to 2011. 
Switching to a fully professional
army 
The President has set a deadline of 2010 for
the Army to switch to a fully contract-based
system. One of the main objectives is the
selection of personnel that meet the
requirements of modern service: a high
degree of professionalism, patriotism and
discipline. 
However, though this policy is appropriate,
simply switching to contract-based
employment will not automatically raise the
professional or ethical standards of
Ukraine’s troops. This requires the
development of a human resource policy 
to encourage young, well-educated people
with strong potential to join the Forces.
Realistic, effective systems need to be
developed to improve the professionalism 
of the nation’s troops and to offer suitable
conditions for both work and rest.
Unfortunately, the absence of a clear policy
makes it less likely at this time that simply
switching to contract-based employment
will lead to any serious qualitative changes
within Ukraine’s Armed Forces. 
Reforming organizational 
and governing structures 
Defense reform cannot ignore the issues of
organizational structure and governance in
the Armed Forces. In 2004, amendments to
the Law “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine”
switched the country from having four
types of Armed Forces to three: Ground
Forces (Army), the Air Force, and the Navy.
The Armed Forces can be divided into three
structures and functions:
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• Combined Rapid Reaction Forces
(CRRF) to react instantly and localize
threats and armed conflicts;
• Main Defense Forces, to reinforce the
CRRF in order to end an armed conflict
and to withstand aggression in the case
of a large-scale violent conflict; 
• Strategic reserves, to reinforce the Main
Defense Forces and be deployed just
before or during violent conflict. 
Since these functional divisions do not
correspond to the new tasks and likely
scenarios for using the Armed Forces
anticipated by the MOD, there are plans to
change this structure. In particular, specific
units that have better trained troops, are
better equipped and are more ready for
battle if necessary will be taken out of both
the CRRF and the Main Defense Forces. It is
also planned to form strategic reserves out
of this structure. 
Another important element of defense
reform has been the introduction of a
J-structure1 to improve internal command
and control and to bring Ukraine army
structures into line with those of NATO
member states. 
Destroying surplus weapons 
and military equipment 
The large number of troops stationed on
Ukrainian territory during soviet times was
matched by a large quantity of weapons and
military equipment. Since independence,
however, much of this has become surplus
and needs to be destroyed. The main
problem is that the state lacks
organizational and physical resources to
destroy weapons and equipment at the
same pace as they become obsolete. This is
a threat to both the environment and the
physical safety of people living near these
stockpiles. 
The Emergency Ministry is currently
responsible for the destruction of
ammunition. In January 2007, the Ministry
began to destroy ammunition in controlled
explosions at the 275th Artillery Base in
Novobohdanivka in Zaporizhzhia oblast.
Unfortunately, the Ukrainian government is
not able to keep up the pace of destroying
weapons and ammunition for institutional
and financial reasons. This problem can only
be solved through much greater cooperation
among different ministries and agencies, the
legislature and international donors. 
Updating necessary military
equipment
Since little money has been spent on
technology in the last decade, the majority
of the Armed Forces’ weapons and
equipment will need to be replaced in the
next few years. The situation is particularly
complicated with types of weapons that are
decisive in modern armed conflicts:
• Most of the Air Force’s fighter planes and
missile units while be obsolete within
five years;
• More than 60% of the country’s
anti-aircraft artillery has been in use for
more than 20 years;
• In the next five to seven years, most of
the Air Force’s missiles and launch
systems will be worn out. 
Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko has
stated that updating military equipment is
one of the most important challenges
facing the Armed Forces. Ukraine needs to
begin planning this now. Otherwise, he says,
“in one to two years, about 50% of the
equipment will stop working, and within
three to five years, 30% – even 50% by
some estimates – of the Combined Rapid
Reaction Forces will not be combat-ready.”
This would devastate the military
effectiveness of Ukraine’s Armed Forces.
Developing new military
technologies 
Since the first years of independence, there
has been a sharp drop in MOD orders for the
domestic defense industry. This has led to
the collapse of many designers and
manufacturers of defense equipment.
The MOD currently makes up no more than
3-5% of orders for the defense industry. In
order not to lose this industry and its related
potential, Ukraine needs to draw up a policy
for comprehensive reform of the industry as
well. Among other things, this would make
the industry more relevant to the needs of
the country’s own Armed Forces. 
Ukraine still possesses a number of leading
technologies and designs, which could be
used not only for export but to re-equip the
national army—provided that there was a
suitable state policy towards defense
production in place.2 However, the miserly
sums that the state can afford to pay for
weaponry means that the internal market in
Ukraine is in collapse. 
Needed: A clear vision 
of the Armed Forces 
Without a clear analysis of the military
threats facing Ukraine, defense reform
cannot be fully effective. Ukraine does not
face any obvious short-term military
threats. In this situation, it is particularly
important to have a clear understanding of
the role of the Armed Forces and the
challenges they face. Such a vision would
help to ensure that efforts to carry out
defense reform are properly targeted. 
It is also necessary to protect the reform of
the Armed Forces from the ongoing political
battles in Ukraine. In most developed
democracies, changes to the political or
military leadership rarely lead to an
immediate change in the military’s key
goals and priorities. Any changes are more
likely to happen with regards to medium-
and long-term planning, but radical
changes are usually avoided. 
You can read the English version of the
“Security Sector Reform in Ukraine” study
online at http://www.icps.com.ua/eng/
project.html?pid=115. For additional
information, contact ICPS government policy
and European integration analyst 
Oleh Myroshnichenko by telephone at
(380-44) 484-4400 or via e-mail at
omyroshnichenko@icps.kiev.ua.
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1 The J-structure is an organizational approach that centers on the function of each ‘J’ or Joint
Element. These elements are different operational structures, such as J-1 (personnel) and J-2
(reconnaissance). 
2 The Pivdenne construction bureau has designed the Hrom tactical missile units and the Korshun
cruise missile. These tactical missiles units are considerably cheaper than planes, yet are equally
effective in defending both land and air space. 
By the way...
• A roundtable called “How to Lower
Housing Prices: The Law on public
debate” took place on 16 March 2007,
organized by ICPS and the Ukrainian
Construction Association. The goal of
this roundtable was to organize 
meaningful public dialog involving
government bodies, builders and the
public to discuss the issue of public
debates in the process of planning and
developing properties and their impact
on housing prices. 
• Public consultations continue as part
of the “Public Consultations and
Information Campaign on Political
Reform in Ukraine” project being 
jointly implemented by ICPS and the
Center for Ukrainian Reform Education
(CURE). The essence of political reform
and its impact at the local level was
discussed in Simferopol on 15 March,
in Mykolayiv on 6 March and in
Dnipropetrovsk on 5 March. During
these hearings, ICPS Director of
Political Programs Viktor Chumak made
a presentation called “Political Reform
in Ukraine: Its Essence and Impact at
the Local Level.
